Вам нужна дипломная работа?
Интересует Экономика?
Оставьте заявку
на Дипломную работу
Получите бесплатную
консультацию по
написанию
Сделайте заказ и
скачайте
результат на сайте
1
2
3

Проанализировать развитие бизнеса

  • 42 страницы
  • 11 источников
  • Добавлена 17.08.2006
930 руб. 3 100 руб.
  • Содержание
  • Часть работы
  • Список литературы
  • Вопросы/Ответы
Introduction
Process of transition
Initial Conditions of Transition
Transition Policies in Russia and Ukraine
Macroeconomic policy
Privatization
Agrarian reforms in Russia and in Ukraine: the comparative analysis
Metal industry
Russia
Ukraine
The insurance markets
The market of cellular communication
Russian oil industry
Economy of Russia and Ukraine in 2005
Process of transition in 2005 in Russia
Process of transition in 2005 in Ukraine
Conclusion
Literature

Фрагмент для ознакомления

AAR's contribution to the new company in percentage of shares is as follows: TNK, 97 %; ONAKO Oil Company, 93 %; SIDANKO, 57 %; Slavneft, 50 %; Rusia Petroleum, 29 %; Rospan International, 44 %; and a 50 % stake in the Sakhalin-6 project. BP for its part brought in 25 % of the shares of SIDANKO, 30 % of the shares of Rusia Petroleum, and 76 % of the shares of Petrol Complex (a Moscow chain of BP gas stations). As compensation for the difference in asset values, BP paid AAR $3.95 billion in cash and committed to transferring its shares for $3.75 billion. The securities will be transferred in three yearly tranches of $1.25 billion each in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
TNK-BP was set up as a model company that was supposed to demonstrate to the world financial community that it really could invest billions of dollars in Russia. This explains Putin and Blair's participation in the final stage of the negotiations. However, according to Vlast's information, a dispute between the executives remaining from TNK and the British management has been brewing for a long time. The Russians think the British are too slow-moving, and the British think the Russians are little more than «highway robbers» who do not want to conduct business in a civilized manner. By all accounts, the differences have already reached the point where the Russian owners of TNK-BP have started negotiations for advance payment of the $3.75 billion still owing by BP.
The History of Production Sharing Agreements
Early 2005 the American companies ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco forfeited the right to develop three blocks of the Sakhalin-3 oil and gas fields. Despite the fact that last year President Putin alluded to a speedy resolution of all problems connected with this project, the committee for implementing production sharing agreements (PSA) annulled the results of a competition for the right to develop it on January 29, 2004. It is not inconceivable that Sakhalin-3 may be included in a comprehensive program to develop the oil and gas fields of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, which will be coordinated by Gazprom instead of Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz. It is interesting that at the same meeting the committee gave approval in general to a PSA project for the Prirazlomnoe oilfield (Arctic shelf of the Pechora Sea). The license holder is ZAO Sevmorneftegaz, formed by Gazprom and Rosneft on a parity basis.
The French company Total has also had no luck with PSA. Russia is refusing to approve the investor's costs for developing the Kharyaginskoe oil field (Nenets Autonomous Area) for 2001-2002. The French maintain that they spent nearly $146 million in 2001 and more than $178 million in 2002. Total has even appealed to the Stockholm Court of Arbitration, but the sitting in this case will not take place until next year.
Royal Dutch Shell did not wait for a PSA to develop the Salymskaya group of oilfields (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area), the license holder for which is Salym Petroleum Development and a joint venture between Shell and Evikhon. Shell decided to develop the field on terms of the national tax regulations – it will spend $200 million both this year and next on Salym.
To all appearances, the days of PSA in Russia are numbered. There remains a slight possibility of obtaining an agreement only by fulfilling two conditions: the project must be offshore, and the candidate company must be on friendly terms with Rosneft. Moreover, Rosneft will demand that its partners pay all exploration and drilling costs. As an example, this year it made such a demand on BP for fields in the Sakhalin-5 section – according to Vlast's information, this company's outlays should amount to $5 billion.
The History of the Baltic Pipeline System
In December 2001, in Primorsk (Leningrad Region) Vladimir Putin opened the first phase of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) – the largest export project in Russia in the entire post-Soviet period. This route was established so that oil exports to ports in Northwestern Europe would go through Russian ports rather than terminals in the Baltic countries (especially the Lithuanian port of Ventspils). The capacity of the first phase of the BPS was 12 million tons of oil per year; and after it reached 18 million tons, Transneft stopped exporting through Ventspils altogether. At present, 42 million tons of oil per year are being pumped through the BPS, and Transneft president Semen Vainshtok estimates that its capacity will increase to 60 million tons in 2006.
However, throughput capacity of Russian domestic pipelines is not keeping pace with the increase in export availability of the BTS. Transneft constantly uses this position in disputes with oil companies that are demanding to send part of the oil through Ventspils. The company needs to spend $143 million on widening the bottlenecks in its Russian system, and it would like the owners of the Ventspils oil terminal to provide the funds.
The BPS is also Transneft's main trump card in the dispute with a consortium of major oil companies that are pushing a project to build a pipeline from Western Siberia to Murmansk. This project appeared in 2002 and proposed the establishment of a new export route with a throughput capacity of 120 million tons of oil per year. Transneft believes it will be too expensive ($12 billion) and that it makes more sense to build a pipeline eastwards.
However, there is one problem here – where exactly will the eastern pipeline go? Transneft is proposing the Taishet-Nakhodka route. The company claims it can be built in four years at a cost of $10.75 billion. Japan is promising to provide most of this amount ($6 billion) in the form of low-interest loans. Japan's interest in the project is not accidental. The point is that there is an alternative route from Angarsk to the Chinese city of Daqing. YUKOS has been promoting this project since 1999, but Transneft has successfully blackballed it. The problem is, this pipeline is included in an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and China.
In order to calm the Chinese, Russia has promised that the pipeline to Nakhodka will include a branch line to Daqing. However, it is unlikely that this compromise option will ever be implemented. Despite constant increases in oil production in Russia, oil companies will not be able to pump the 80–100 million tons of oil eastwards that are needed to load both Far Eastern routes in four years. And a breach of international agreements will hardly improve relations between Russia and China.
The History of Development of the West
In recent years, Russian companies have been actively buying up refining and transportation facilities in Central and Eastern European countries. The largest oil refineries in neighboring Ukraine are shared among LUKOIL, TNK, and Tatneft; LUKOIL owns the Burgas oil refinery in Bulgaria and the Petrotel plant in Romania, while YUKOS owns 49 % of the shares of the Slovakian pipeline company Transpetrol. The share of Russian oil capital in refineries in neighboring countries will probably increase in the future.
Russian companies are also interested in Western gas station chains. At the end of 2000, LUKOIL acquired the American company Getty Petroleum Marketing, which includes 1291 service stations in 13 Atlantic coast states, for about $60 billion (most of these operate as franchises). The company also owns ten petroleum storage depots. Nearly 4 % of the gasoline sold in the United States is marketed under the Getty brand name, and the company is among the five largest traders.
LUKOIL made a similar acquisition in January of this year – the company announced the purchase of 795 service stations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania from ConocoPhilips for $265.75 million. Today, LUKOIL services more than 2000 American gas stations, and annual fuel sales are around 12 billion liters. In the near future, LUKOIL will start repainting the acquired service stations (they operate under the Mobil logo) in its own colors.
YUKOS managed to implement another project that LUKOIL hatched in the mid-1990s, i. e., the acquisition of a controlling block of shares in the Lithuanian company Mazekiu Nafta (MN), which includes the Mazeikiai oil refinery, the only oil refinery in the Baltic countries. In June 2002, YUKOS became the owner of 53.7 % of MN s shares and gained the status of operator of the company.
We note that not all Eastern European refiners have agreed to control by Russian oil companies. For example, the Poles did not allow LUKOIL to privatize the Gdansk oil refinery.
Nevertheless, what is taking place shows that Russian oil companies are quite healthy despite all the problems within the country, and have not only retained the potential to develop into transnational companies in the past four years, but have also advanced quite far along this track. The speed of this advancement will directly depend on oil prices and the future course of relations between the industry and the government.
Economy of Russia and Ukraine in 2005
According to the European Reconstruction and Development Bank for last year the CIS countries have noticeably moved ahead on a way of reforms though one of them thus have achieved greater, than others.
Events in a political life of Ukraine by which the end of 2004 was marked, have come to the end with coming to power of new leaders, loyal to business of construction of democracy, market reforms and the European integration. At a new management the country began to increase the successes reached by the previous government on two directions of transformations: in the field of trade and a currency mode where restrictions on export have been cancelled and there is passed a number of necessary stages in creation of legislative base for the introduction into WTO, and also in bank system where mechanisms Regulations have improved, crediting a private sector has extended and the share of the foreign capital has increased. And still, despite of these concrete achievements, promotion in other areas was slower, than it was expected, and questions in occasion of ambiguously apprehended program of returning in a state ownership of some the Ukrainian companies which privatization of authority have found illegal, still remain without the answer
Reforms in Russia have started to revolve in many respects. Unique exception is the financial system where parameters of activity of banks have improved, universal intermediate term strategy of development has been accepted, successes in creation of mechanisms of insurance of contributions are reached and the legal and administrative base has essentially become stronger. It has led to improvement of the parameter reflecting development of financial establishments.
At the same time because of expansion of intervention of the state in a number of key spheres of economy process of privatization in Russia for last year was essentially braked. The state has returned to itself the basic share of the property and the control over a number of the large companies and the important actives in oil-and-gas branch. In view of such easing positions of a private sector the estimation for privatization of the large enterprises has been lowered on one point. Strengthening of influence of the state in conditions of the stopped reform of official bodies can fatally be reflected in quality of corporate management as the Russian state enterprises, as a rule, are less transparent and less believe in commercial principles, than private. Delays with the further reforming and re-structuring of power and other key industries are possible also.
The political situation in Ukraine became even less predicted after resignation of the prime minister and change of structure of ruling coalition in September, 2005.
In Russia the gain of gross national product should be reduced in it, 2006, to year up to 6 % in comparison with
Last year's level in 7,1 % because of less intensive expansion of oil extracting and easings of internal investment activity.
Process of transition in 2005 in Russia
The degree of intervention of the state in economy and centralization of management for last year has raised. To reduction of influence of a private sector testify restoration of the state control over Gazprom (and a number belonging it bank and media holdings) and the basic part of the actives belonged company « Yukos». Process of market liberalization also has suffered because of the large-scale campaign of selective collecting of shortages undertaken by tax bodies for the last years and as a result uses of the state enterprises in a role of tools for carrying out of policy of the government. Alongside with it it is necessary to note inclusion of the high-ranking officials in boards of directors of the companies of public sector and toughening of regulation in the branches considered by authorities as «strategic».
Negative consequences of it for the general business climate in the country were partially counterbalanced by preservation of strong macroeconomic parameters and an abundance of liquidity owing to significant inflow of capitals. Three commercial rating agencies have appropriated Russia a rating of an investment class, and the Russian companies and banks use more and more wide access on the international markets of the capital. However again getting stronger trust of investors, probably, speaks not so much deep improvement of economy, how many rise of the prices for oil. Carrying out of judicial reform has stopped also. According to from several sources, corruption still carries system character, and in some spheres continues to be aggravated.
2005 year was marked by only modest achievements in reforming an infrastructure. Reform of gas sector still does not join a management in number of direct problems. Proceeded, though and not so fast rates, re-structuring of power where the further partition of vertically integrated regional power companies and creation of the enterprises specializing on development and wholesale deliveries of the electric power took place. Statutory acts in execution of the law of 2003 about the telecommunications, liberalizations of the market concerning, first of all, intercity and the international communication are accepted. In May, 2005 the government has given out three new licenses to alternative operators of distant telecommunication. It, predictably, should weaken present exclusive positions of «Rostelecom» in the given segment of the market. At the same time official opening of access is postponed for the market of services of distant telecommunication prior to the beginning of 2006. Still the question on privatization of the national telecommunication holding « Svyazinvest « supervising through the regional structures and company « Rostelecom « the basic part of the market wire, and also intercity and the international communication waits for the decision.
After summer of 2004 when a number of private banks has collided with sharp deficiency of liquidity, in bank system essential transformations are lead. Its fast growth on such parameters, as volume of actives, the sums of deposits, the sizes of the capital and credits to a private sector has renewed. In April, 2005 the government and the Central bank Russia (Central Bank of Russia) had been accepted new intermediate term strategy of development of bank sector. On results of the first round of an estimation of candidates on the introduction into system of insurance of contributions 835 (75 %) from them by April, 2005 have been recognized corresponding shown requirements. Thus the Central Bank of Russia has toughened mechanisms of regulation and supervision.
More strict requirements to the capital, new principles of a reserve covering of losses and the daily control of financial factors have been entered; in the field of supervision instead of a principle of the control over observance the principle of the control of risks is introduced. Since 2005 application of the International Standards of the Financial Reporting became obligatory though while they are observed not completely for banks. Among the laws already accepted or considered by parliament mentioning bank system — the law on credit bureaues, the law on the consolidated reporting, syndicates, merges and absorption, and also the law adjusting disclosing of the information on structure of the property of banks.
The delay which has outlined 2004 of economic development has proceeded and in the first half-year 2005. Rates of increase in extraction and export of oil have sharply decreased, and the effect of traditional factors of growth has gone on recession in conditions of the further strengthening a real rouble exchange rate and more and more deficit of capacities. Real gross national product in annual calculation has grown on 5,6 %, and industrial production — only on 4 % whereas for the similar period of 2004 these parameters have made, accordingly, 7,6 % and 7,3 %. Growth of investments though some revival was outlined in second half of summer in this sphere was braked also. However the descending tendency restrained influence of the demand expressed in increase of the prices for oil.
Inflow of means to the state treasury is still plentiful on a wave of 36 percent increase in first half of 2005 of the world prices for basic clauses of the Russian export. Proficiency of the state budget in the first half-year has reached 33,5 billion US dollar, almost three times having exceeded a level fixed for the same period of 2004. According to last estimations of the government, on results of year it should leave on a mark of gross national product of 7 % at an initial target parameter in 1,5 %. The size of stabilization fund has grown for first half of 2005 on 2,8 billion US dollar and has made in total 21,6 billion dollars — that 15,1 billion US dollar from it has been used for preschedule repayment of a part of a 40-milliard duty to the Parisian club. The government also has completely paid a duty of IMF at a rate of 3,3 billion US dollar. Inflationary pressure continued to accrue, and by July, 2005 the consumer price index has raised in annual calculation on 13,3 %. In it consequences of growth of monetary base, feed consumption were showed at slowed down rates of manufacture, and also results of increase of the prices adjustable by the state, such, as tariffs of natural monopolies.
Owing to the high prices for the goods of raw group the positive balance of the current balance of payments has increased by July, 2005 up to 46,6 billion US dollar in comparison about 26,3 billion dollars in the end of June, 2004. It allows to assume, that on results of year proficiency will make about 12 % of gross national product. The international reserves of the Central Bank of Russia which by the end of June, 2005 have grown in comparison with the end of the last year on 21,7 % — up to 151,6 billion US dollar are still record-breaking great also. Despite of political uncertainty, inflow to the country of direct foreign investments, according to estimations of the Central Bank of Russia, has reached in first half of 2005 of a record level in 9,3 billion US dollar. As a result the pure sum of private capitals leaving the country was cut almost by half — up to 5,6 billion US dollar.
Despite of preservation of the high prices for raw material, real rates of growth in 2005 are predicted at a level about 6 % (whereas in 2004 they made 7,1 %). Intermediate term prospects depend on, whether it will be possible to restore trust of investors and the lost rates of carrying out of reforms. However because of disagreements among the maximum political management from it inconsistent signals concerning the future policy of the government and its priorities in the field of the further transformations that calls into question into ability of authorities to carry out planned measures on improvement of an investment climate proceed. In conditions of strong inflationary pressure the most serious risk in the short-term and intermediate term plan is connected with possible moods of self-calmness under influence of the high prices on oil, and also with easing budgetary restrictions (for 2006 it is predicted more than 40 percent increase in budgetary charges in nominal rouble expression). Besides in process of mitigation of budgetary policy the parallel balanced achievement of such purposes, as restraint of inflation and observance of the planned parameters of the exchange rate as both these problems simultaneously cannot be solved by means monetary regulation more and more becomes complicated.
Process of transition in 2005 in Ukraine
One of basic principles of policy of the new government is the rate on deeper integration into the European political and economic structures and into economic. However the embodiment during a life of plans under the introduction into the World trading organization (WTO) by the end of 2005 will depend on the further progress at bilateral negotiations and from the statement parliament of the remained part of a legislative package which acceptance is necessary for performance of conditions of WTO. As of July, 2005 by Ukraine it is signed 37 of 50 bilateral reports with the countries — members of the World trading organization. Before summer vacations the parliament has already accepted eight of 14 acts concerning trade. Among them — the major law on protection of intellectual property rights which can open a way to the conclusion of a bilateral agreement from the USA.
Receipts from privatization have reached in 2004 of the highest level in 9,4 billion grivna (1,7 billion US dollar), considerably having exceeded budgetary figure in 5,2 billion grivna owing to sale of control share holdings of some the large enterprises of strategic value. However the order of carrying out and legality of some of these transactions have been called into question and are now a subject of repeated consideration.
From the beginning of 2005 reorganization of machinery of state and struggle against corruption are considered as key priorities of reforms. On official data, from official bodies it is already dismissed about 18 000 employees; reform of customs service is lead also. At the same time for creation of stable and transparent system of the taxation and regulation of business still it is necessary to do the certain work.
According to inspection of a business climate and a condition of the business, the lead European Reconstruction and Development Bank and the World bank in 2005, problems of tax administration and an abundance of bureaucratic norms concern to number of three most serious obstacles for development of enterprise activity in Ukraine.
The amendments approved in March, 2005 to the law on the budget for 2005 have led to significant change of a tax mode and system of social insurance for private enterprises. They, in particular, provide reduction of number of kinds of activity from which the value-added tax (VAT) is not raised, and a lumpsum cancelling of tax privileges and clearings of payment of taxes for special economic zones (SEZ) and regions of prime development. Though these measures promoted liquidation of tax loopholes and maintenance of equal conditions for businessmen, they can cause damage to interests of the domestic within the limits of law domestic and foreign companies, whose investments in SEZ have been caused by reception of tax privileges. The system of simplified taxation МСП has been subjected to revision, but then restored in a former kind by the presidential decree from June, 2005.
Crisis of liquidity in the fourth quarter 2004, provoked by flight of investors during November presidential elections, has been quickly overcome by National bank of Ukraine (NBU). The majority of the emergency measures entered for maintenance of liquidity of banks, and in particular restrictions on currency transactions and on removal of means from accounts of legal and physical persons, have been cancelled already by the end of 2004. To the middle of 2005 the volume of bank credits has returned to a pre-crisis level, having shown
Growth on 17,4 % in annual calculation. To updating of liquidity of banks for the same period
Inflow of the contributions which have increased in real expression on 20,3 % promoted.
In April, 2005 NBU has taken steps on the further liberalization of a currency mode, having abolished position about obligatory sale of 50 % of export proceeds. In July, 2005 the parliament also had been passed in the first reading the new law expanding freedom of activity of branches of foreign banks. It can promote development of a competition and increase of efficiency of bank system. In the end of August, 2005 the bank holding « Reiffenzen International» has declared purchase of 93,5 % by it of actions of bank «Aval» — the second-largest Ukrainian bank supervising about 8,7 % of bank actives of the country. End of this transaction which is a subject to the statement adjusting bodies, is expected in October.
Annual rates of growth of real gross national product were slowed down in the first half-year 2005 up to 4 % in comparison from 12,1 % in 2004. If in the past to year its basic factor was prompt expansion of export of the raw goods in 2005 growth became feed by mainly internal consumption on a wave of increase of salaries and pensions. After the recession fixed in last quarter 2004, investment activity is still insignificant because of uncertainty of a business climate, in particular in a view of revision of results of privatization for the last years. The increase in volumes of industrial production and construction in first half of 2005 was slowed down, whereas in an agriculture the moderate growth on a parameter of the added cost was marked.
In August, 2005 rates of inflation in a consumer sector have reached 14,9 % in annual calculation that spoke increase of the prices for oil and food stuffs, and also consequences of easing of budgetary restrictions before elections of 2004. Aspiring to bridle inflation, НБУ in August has lifted a discount rate up to 9,5 % and has declared the intention since September to raise with 7 up to 8 % the obligatory specification of a reserve covering of deposits poste restante. After 5 percent nominal increase in April, 2005 the rate of grivna remains stable. Results of March amendments to the law on the budget of 2005 of steel more rigid financial-budgetary policy and significant expansion of tax base. At the same time the debts on compensation of the VAT has grown for first half of 2005 more than up to 3 billion grivnas (620 million US dollar). In the reconsidered budget for 2005 substantial growth of social charges, first of all in connection with payment of pensions and increase of the minimal salaries also is incorporated.
Strengthening of the real exchange rate and easing of foreign demand for metallurgical production of Ukraine have led to delay of rates of growth of export in the first half-year 2005. Demand for the import goods, stimulated by increase of an average level of real incomes of the population, advanced expansion of export owing to what the positive balance of trading balance for the first half-year 2005 was cut by half in comparison with the similar period of 2004. In the past to year stable growth of the total reserves which have reached to the middle September of an annual maximum — 12,5 billion US dollar was marked. Then, after short-term recession in the end of 2004, they by the end of August, 2005 send on a mark 14,2 billion US dollar, providing a covering of import more than in four-monthly volume.
« Orange revolution », come to pass in December, 2004, has improved long-term prospects of democratic stability and carrying out of reforms. However reformatory parties did not manage to reach sufficient political unity, and in September, 2005 in the country the structure of the government was replaced. In the short-term plan a number of the important problems of the general character is not solved. Annual rates of inflation are expressed by two-place figures, and forecasts of economic growth specify that in 2005-2006 it will be slowed down approximately up to 4-5 %, after rather impressive parameters for the last two years.
Conclusion
Comparing the Ukrainian and Russian economies is interesting in determining signs of progress, but not quite fair. The lion's share of Russia's exports (oil and gas) brought in record windfalls for the state coffers due to high market prices. Ukraine's highly-valued export steel faced stiff competition this year in the world market, despite soaring Chinese demand.
Russia is a «petrostate.» It is not fair to compare Ukraine to Russia economically, or for that matter compare Russia to China. Russia should be compared to Venezuela, Nigeria or Kazakhstan.
In development of economy of two states for years of independence of distinctions it is much more, than similarities. But similar parameters show depressing picture — macroeconomic parameters have catastrophically fallen. That fact testifies to it, that, according to National institute of the Ukrainian-Russian attitudes, for ten years in Ukraine and Russia not only there was a recession of industrial production, but also degradation of structure of national economies, «washing away» of highly technological, high technology modern manufactures.
For example, the share of mechanical engineering and metal working in the general structure of Ukrainian production has decreased for ten years with 30,7 to 13,8 %, and relative density of production of a fuel and energy complex and metallurgy has grown with 19,9 up to 51,6 %. In Russia these parameters are very close to Ukrainian that in the developed countries the share of thermal power station and metallurgy does not exceed 25 %, and up to 58 % of production it is necessary on the ready goods.
Comparison of macroeconomic parameters of Ukraine and Russia in 1991 and 2000 testifies to prompt falling parameters in both states, but the Ukrainian economy nevertheless has gone through stronger impact. So, decrease in an internal total product in Ukraine for ten years has made 40,4 %, in Russia — 35 %.
This parameter is considered the major, defining parameter of economic development of the country, therefore we shall compare gross national product per capita in absolute figures. In 2001 in Russia it made $1149, in Ukraine — $488. In the past to year the Ukrainian parameter has grown up to $635, that all the same almost twice below, than in Russia of «year prescription».
Manufacture of an industrial output in Ukraine was reduced to 36 %, in Russia — on 34 %, the gross output of an agriculture has accordingly decreased on 31 % and 29 %, and retail commodity circulation — on 42 % and 18 %.
But most of all guards prompt ageing the basic production assets because of decrease in capital investments. In particular, the gain of investments into a fixed capital for ten years was reduced to 68 % in both countries. Therefore, if the degree of deterioration of the basic production assets in the developed economy makes 25 %, and the threshold indicator of economic safety of the state supposes a degree of deterioration not above 50 %, in Ukraine it makes 80 %, in Russia reaches 75 %.
General in parameters of two countries also that the world economic practice before did not know similar rates of degradation of economic complexes. For example, within Great depression of 1929-1931 in the USA volumes of manufacture have decreased on 30 %, in «reorganization» Poland — only on 14 %.
Unique macroeconomic parameter which to two countries managed to be increased are volumes of export. In Ukraine by 2000 export has grown in 1,91 times (against the Russian parameter 1,8 times), but thus import of production our country has grown in 1,95 times while in Russia it has decreased almost on half.
On a level of the international barter, that is on parameters of trading operations per capita as Russia, and Ukraine considerably concede to the EU countries. For example, in Russia this parameter makes $788, in Ukraine — $469, and in the Great Britain, France, Germany — from $4000 up to $6000.
It is obvious, that is incomparable greater opportunities of Russia to trade in a source of raw materials, in particular energy carriers, at a favorable conjuncture of the international market puts northern neighbour in obviously more favourable position. The same commodity group causes advantage of volumes of import of the Russian goods to Ukraine above export to this country. So, in 1993 import Russia made $5379 million, export to Russia — $3814 million, in 2000 import — $5824,9 million, export — $3515,6 million Thus, the negative balance of trading balance for Ukraine has grown for these years with $1565 up to $2309,3, or on 47,6 %.
Since 1993 the Ukrainian deliveries to Russia decreased significant rates, and to the most essential this reduction has concerned production of industrial purpose. So, with 1991 for 1993 deliveries of black hire, high-quality steel and tractors, twice — steel pipes and lorries, in 21 times — mineral fertilizers were three times reduced, much less we began to export the equipment for metallurgical and a petroleum-refining industry. Actually, on manufacture of this production the enterprises of Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy and Chernigov areas specialized basically. But crisis in trade relations has concerned not only large, but also unique manufacturers. For example, in Chernigov there was a unique factory in the USSR on manufacture of fire machines, 60 which % were delivered to Russia. In 1993 purchases of technics have been completely stopped. In the Sumy area powerful manufacture of pumps which deliveries to Russia were the same year reduced three times is located.
Today Russia and Ukraine on the most perspective directions have already adjusted a full cycle of manufacture of the weapon, and cooperation in military-technical area which experience in the West of the Europe, hypertrophied in a competition in its East. Such tendency — formation of the closed cycles of manufacture inside of the state — by the way, is observed in all basic branches of final manufacture both in Ukraine, and in Russia. Russia, without participation of other republics, could make in 1990 only 45 % of all production. With disintegration of the USSR it has started to close purposefully work cycles on herself, creating new own manufactures of accessories. In Ukraine to this problem send much less quickly, but nevertheless it was possible to begin manufacture of separate kinds of production, for example mini-tractors and combines, independently
Traditionally in structure of trade of Ukraine from the Russian Federation the greatest share in 90th years ignoble metals and products from them — borrowed 22-25 %. Reduction of deliveries to Russia the Ukrainian pig-iron more than in 300 times is connected with reorientation of its deliveries in the far abroad. On separate positions the Ukrainian metallurgists simply not in a condition to satisfy the Russian consumers.
In spite of the fact that with 1991 for 2000 Ukrainian metal industry have partially lost the positions on welded pipes of the big diameter, they managed so strongly to be fixed in this market, that their deliveries in 2001 have been cut down by quotas in volume 413 thousand tons for a year.
The newest mutual relations of two states bear a number of problems which from time to time threaten economic safety of Ukraine. So, in sphere of trade in the goods and grantings of services for us introduction by the Russian party of licensing the additional customs duties and other similar restrictions is unsafe.
Transition of mutually advantageous bilateral economic attitudes in sphere of trading wars with use of protecting duties and antidumping investigations today already complicates a life not only to the Ukrainian manufacturers, but also the Russian consumers and owners of the Ukrainian enterprises.
Tactics of an antidumping survival of the Ukrainian competitors from the market began to be applied rather recently, but it has already concerned the order of 70 names of the goods, beginning from salt and finishing or are planned by pipes and metal rolling on which restrictive decisions are born trials.
Negatively delay of Russia with realization of a mode of free trade, reorientation of import (up to 75 %) on the countries of the far abroad affects economic safety. Critical for us there is a question of removal of dependence on the Russian energy carriers in this connection the problem diversification their deliveries is still actual. In sphere of energy carriers attempt of Russia to discredit the project of delivery of the Caspian oil on a route Odessa-fords is memorable and to adjust own deliveries of oil and gas around of Ukraine.
Till now because of insufficient financing from two states coproduction of planes of mark An is braked. And serial release An-70, let alone other perspective projects is not adjusted.
The basic things in common of two countries in the field of electric power industry are caused by that in 1990 87 % of all export of the Soviet electric power was made through Ukraine. For the last decade, after several switching-off of the power supply system from Ukrainian, Russians have lost this export route.
One more problem consists that Russia does not wish to consider loss at transportation of the electric power, first, and high cost of the Ukrainian electric power, secondly.
To estimate prospects of economic cooperation of Ukraine and Russia follows from two positions — an economic pragmatism which today shows each of the states more and more, and politicians of smooth integration into the international economic community. These vectors leave a place for mutually advantageous cooperation in economic area. And interests of Ukraine in attitudes with the Russian Federation consist in creation of conditions for long-term economic relations. It is obvious, that we are interested in fuller loading domestic capacities. It, in opinion of experts of National institute of the Ukrainian-Russian attitudes, will allow not only to increase deliveries of raw material, to increase volumes of processing, but also to increase presence of production of the Ukrainian enterprises in the market of the Russian Federation.
Today the most effective areas of cooperation of two countries — space-rocket sphere and oil refining. Besides perspective from the point of view of teamwork there is an aircraft construction, petrochemistry, shipbuilding.
All spectrum of existing problems does not allow two countries to be integrated deeply economically. And politically.
Literature
Antczak, Rafał (1994): Handel zagraniczny Rosji w 1993 roku i pierwszym kwartale 1994 roku (Russian Foreign Trade in 1993 and the first quarter of 1994), CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 25, August.
Bauc, Jarosław (1995): Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 38, April.
Bratkowski, Andrzej S. (1993): The Shock of Transformation or Transformation of the Shock, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, Vol. 5, No. 1.
Cottarelli, Carlo, and Mario I. Blejer (1991): Forced Savings and Repressed Inflation in the Soviet Union: Some Empirical Results, IMF Working Paper, Washington DC.
Dąbrowski, Marek (1994): The Ukrainian Way to Hyperinflation, Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, Vol. 6, No. 2.
Dąbrowski, Marek et al. (1993): The Gaidar Programme. Lessons for Poland and Eastern Europe, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw
Dąbrowski, Marek, and Jacek Rostowski (1995): What Went Wrong? The Reasons for the Failure of Stabilization in Russia, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 44, June.
Dąbrowski, Marek, and Rafał Antczak (forthcoming): Disintegration of the Ruble Area and Attempts at Its Reconstruction, in: Dąbrowski, Marek et al.: The Second Year of Economic Reform in Russia, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Edelman, Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
Evseeva-Bojewa, Irina, and Tatiana Dolgopiatova (forthcoming): Russian State Enterprises in 1993, in: Dąbrowski, Marek et al.: The Second Year of Economic Reform in Russia, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Goldman, ed. Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1998).
IEA (1995): Finansovaya stabilizatsiya v Rossii, Institut Ekonomicheskogo Analiza, Moscow
IEPPP (1995): Rossiiskaya ekonomika v 1994 godu. Tendentsii i perspektivy, Institut Ekonomicheskikh Problem Perekhodnogo Perioda, Moscow.
IMF (1992): Economic Review. Russian Federation, Washington DC., April.
IMF (1993a): Russian Federation, IMF Economic Review, No. 8.
IMF (1993b): Ukraine, IMF Economic Review, No. 10.
IMF, The World Bank, OECD and EBRD (1990), The Economy of the USSR. Summary and
Jermakowicz, Władysław, Julian Pańków, and Aleksandr Abramov (1994): Voucher Privatization in Russia, Studies & Analyses CASE № 21, June.
Jessica Allina-Pisano, «Sravnitel'nyi analiz provedeniia agrarnykh reform na Ukraine i v Rossii,» Otechestvennye zapiski, Spring 2004
Moyo Sam, Land reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change in the Mashonaland Provinces Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000.
Murrell Peter, «What is shock therapy? What did it do in Russia and Poland?» PostSoviet Affairs 9:2 April-June 1993, 111—140.
Orlowski, Lucjan T. (1993): Indirect Transfers in Trade Among Former Soviet Union Republics: Sources, Patterns and Policy Responses in the Post-Soviet Period, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6.
Recommendation (A study undertaken in response to a request by the Houston Summit), 19 December
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (1995): Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in Light of the East Asian Experiences, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 39, April.
Scott James, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Święcicki, Marcin and Stanisław Wellisz (1993): The Economy of Ukraine. A Memorandum on Stabilization and Structural Reform, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw & Center for Advanced Economic Studies in Kiev, Studies and Analyses, No.2, September.
Szelenyj Ivan, ed. Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Socialist Societies (London: Routledge, 1998).
Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS — European Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis of the Ukraine & Ministry of Economy of the Ukraine, April 1995.
Мельник, «Виробництво — для людей, а не навпаки: iнтерв’ю з головою держадмiнiстрацii Харкiвського району В. И. Пугачовим», Слобiдський край, 13 мая, 1999, 2.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (1995): Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in Light of the East Asian Experiences, CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 39, April
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Wing Thye Woo (1994): Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms in China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union, Economic Policy, .Vol. 18, April

Cottarelli, Carlo, and Mario I. Blejer (1991): Forced Savings and Repressed Inflation in the Soviet Union: Some Empirical Results, IMF Working Paper, Washington DC

Dąbrowski, Marek et al. (1993): The Gaidar Programme. Lessons for Poland and Eastern Europe, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw

Święcicki, Marcin and Stanisław Wellisz (1993): The Economy of Ukraine. A Memorandum on Stabilization and Structural Reform, CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw & Center for Advanced Economic Studies in Kiev, Studies and Analyses, No.2, September

See Peter Murrell, “What is shock therapy? What did it do in Russia and Poland?” PostSoviet Affairs 9:2 (April-June 1993), 111—140, Jefferey Sachs, Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994)
James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
Мельник М, Виробництво — для людей, а не навпаки: iнтерв’ю з головою держадмiнiстрацii Харкiвського району В. И. Пугачовим, Слобiдський край, 13 мая, 1999, 2
Michael Goldman, ed. Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1998)
See Marc Edelman, Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) and Sam Moyo, Land reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change in the Mashonaland Provinces (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000)
Ivan Szelenyj, ed. Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Socialist Societies (London: Routledge, 1998)
Transition Report 2005: Business in transition, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm




11

Literature
Antczak, Rafal (1994): Handel zagraniczny Rosji w 1993 roku i pierwszym kwartale 1994 roku (Russian Foreign Trade in 1993 and the first quarter of 1994), CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 25, August.
Bauc, Jaroslaw (1995): Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 38, April.
Bratkowski, Andrzej S. (1993): The Shock of Transformation or Transformation of the Shock, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, Vol. 5, No. 1.
Cottarelli, Carlo, and Mario I. Blejer (1991): Forced Savings and Repressed Inflation in the Soviet Union: Some Empirical Results, IMF Working Paper, Washington DC.
Dabrowski, Marek (1994): The Ukrainian Way to Hyperinflation, Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, Vol. 6, No. 2.
Dabrowski, Marek et al. (1993): The Gaidar Programme. Lessons for Poland and Eastern Europe, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw
Dabrowski, Marek, and Jacek Rostowski (1995): What Went Wrong? The Reasons for the Failure of Stabilization in Russia, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 44, June.
Dabrowski, Marek, and Rafal Antczak (forthcoming): Disintegration of the Ruble Area and Attempts at Its Reconstruction, in: Dabrowski, Marek et al.: The Second Year of Economic Reform in Russia, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Edelman, Peasants against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
Evseeva-Bojewa, Irina, and Tatiana Dolgopiatova (forthcoming): Russian State Enterprises in 1993, in: Dabrowski, Marek et al.: The Second Year of Economic Reform in Russia, CASE and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
Goldman, ed. Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1998).
IEA (1995): Finansovaya stabilizatsiya v Rossii, Institut Ekonomicheskogo Analiza, Moscow
IEPPP (1995): Rossiiskaya ekonomika v 1994 godu. Tendentsii i perspektivy, Institut Ekonomicheskikh Problem Perekhodnogo Perioda, Moscow.
IMF (1992): Economic Review. Russian Federation, Washington DC., April.
IMF (1993a): Russian Federation, IMF Economic Review, No. 8.
IMF (1993b): Ukraine, IMF Economic Review, No. 10.
IMF, The World Bank, OECD and EBRD (1990), The Economy of the USSR. Summary and
Jermakowicz, Wladyslaw, Julian Pankow, and Aleksandr Abramov (1994): Voucher Privatization in Russia, Studies & Analyses CASE № 21, June.
Jessica Allina-Pisano, «Sravnitel'nyi analiz provedeniia agrarnykh reform na Ukraine i v Rossii,» Otechestvennye zapiski, Spring 2004
Moyo Sam, Land reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change in the Mashonaland Provinces Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000.
Murrell Peter, «What is shock therapy? What did it do in Russia and Poland?» PostSoviet Affairs 9:2 April-June 1993, 111—140.
Orlowski, Lucjan T. (1993): Indirect Transfers in Trade Among Former Soviet Union Republics: Sources, Patterns and Policy Responses in the Post-Soviet Period, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6.
Recommendation (A study undertaken in response to a request by the Houston Summit), 19 December
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (1995): Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union in Light of the East Asian Experiences, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Studies and Analyses, No. 39, April.
Scott James, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Swiecicki, Marcin and Stanislaw Wellisz (1993): The Economy of Ukraine. A Memorandum on Stabilization and Structural Reform, CASE — Center for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw & Center for Advanced Economic Studies in Kiev, Studies and Analyses, No.2, September.
Szelenyj Ivan, ed. Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Socialist Societies (London: Routledge, 1998).
Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS — European Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis of the Ukraine & Ministry of Economy of the Ukraine, April 1995.
Мельник, «Виробництво — для людей, а не навпаки: iнтерв’ю з головою держадмiнiстрацii Харкiвського району В. И. Пугачовим», Слобiдський край, 13 мая, 1999, 2.

Выявить в ГК нормы, которые определяют особенности порядка заключения договоров по недвижимости и проанализировать их

Выявить в ГК нормы, которые определяют особенности порядка заключения договоров по недвижимости и проанализировать их

Контрольная работа студентки 3 курса 6 семестра заочного отделения 3 группы Носенко Марины Викторовны

МГСУ, юридический Факультет

Москва,

1999

1. Понятие договора.

Переход к рыночным отношениям, проведение экономической реформы, полностью изменяет сферу применения и использование договора, его роль и значение в гражданском обороте.

Любая предпринимательская деятельность связана с использованием договора. Договор так же находит широкое применение в отношениях между гражданами, поэтому рассмотрим выделенные в ГК положения о договоре.

Договором признается соглашение двух или нескольких лиц, согласованное волеизъявление субъектов гражданского права, направленные на установление правоотношений. ( Арт.420 ГА РФ)

по договору понимается совокупность условий, определяющих действия сторон и подписано сторонами.

Договор является правомерной сделки, которая создает обязанности. Граждане и юридические лица свободны в заключение договоров и самостоятельно решают с кем и какие договора им заключать, а также согласовывать их условия. Договор заключается посредством направления ОФЕРТЫ (предложения заключить договор) одной из сторон и АКЦЕПТА (принятия предложения другой стороной). ( Арт. 432 ГК РФ)

Договор вступает в силу и становится обязательным для сторон с момента его заключения, срок действия договора устанавливается по соглашению сторон. По истечении срока действия договора не освобождает стороны от ответственности за его нарушение. ( Арт.425 ГК РФ)

Изменение и расторжение договора возможны по соглашению сторон, если иное не предусмотрено ГК РФ. В случае, если стороны не достигли соглашения о приведении договора в соответствие с изменившимися обстоятельствами, договор может быть расторгнут или изменен судом по требованию заинтересованной стороны,

При расторжении договора обязательства сторон прекращаются. (Арт.450-453 ГК РФ).

2. Особенности купли-продажи недвижимого имущества.

В ст. 130 ГА РФ говорится, что к недвижимому имуществу помимо земельных участков, а также здания, сооружения, нежилые помещения, прочно связанные с ней.

Договор продажи недвижимости является видом купли-продажи, а основным признаком, позволяющим выделить этот вид договора, является объектом недвижимого имущества.

Узнать стоимость работы