Третий сектор в странах среднего уровня развития.
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This creates a dynamic of "mixed motives, diffused responsibilities, and general confusion about who is accountable to whom". Among the participants from faith-based NGOs, patterns of discretion seem to be divided primarily along lines of national origin. In any case, if we consider beneficiaries of foreign aid to have a right to freedom of expression and freedom of association, the manner in which NGO employees use their discretion when providing services becomes an important concern.Finally, “Qestioning the noncoercive nature of nonprofits: choosing not toassociate”. The first of Frumkin's three features of the nonprofit sector is the noncoercivenature of voluntary organizations. While clientele may not be "coerced" into participation in the most literal sense of the word, economic and social conditions oblige them to consume services from whoever provides them, regardless of the religious affiliation of the NGO or the religious activities that may accompany service provision. Nor is voice a realistic option, considering that many clients will be reluctant to express discontent with the NGOs on which they often depend for their very survival. As a conclusion, the complex issue of public funding of faith-based organizations becomes increasingly complicated in an international setting. Future research can suggest means of mitigating potential problems related to ethnic and religious identity while benefiting from the solidarity these organizations share with their communities.The eighth article: “Deportation to Democratization: The Role of an Authentic NGO in Romania”.Kandis Scott starts with the observation of a consolidated democracy depends in part on a vital civil society, one element of which is a web of voluntary organizations. The West's attempts to develop these associations in Eastern Europe have floundered as the groups prove unsustainab. For over a decade, the West has been exporting democracy to Eastern Europe. One important part of this shipment is the stimulationof non-governmental organization. But sustainability is now a grave concern.This essay presents a detailed look at one such NGO: the Associationof Former Bãrãgan Deportees of Timisoara, Romania, not because it is important in itself but as a paradigmatic example of often overlooked non-governmental organization.A brief history of the deportation suffices to set the scene for the later creation of the NGO.6 Romania responded to the Cominform expulsion of Yugoslavia in 19487 by closing the Yugoslav border and later deporting families from the adjoining region (the Banat) in a harsh show of power.The deportation of 40,000 people is a remarkable and horrible story, the origin of their association is a more remarkable but positive one. Despite their success with beneficial projects,23 many NGOs serving a western agenda lack the legitimacy and financial self-sufficiency of the Deportees' Association. Active voluntary participation in an organization teaches civic values and leads to a concern for the larger community. Volunteer support also preserves the authentic quality of an organization in the event it receives non-member funding.In many countries NGOs build democracyby teaching organizational and leadership skills, but most citizens of former communist states already have those skills. The Former Deportees' Association also was able to look to other Romanian organizations for models. As mentioned, the deportees knew of the national transitional government's promise not to perpetuate itself and of the political prisoners' lobbying for reparation.As a conclusion we can notice, that it is needed from the United States and Europe are encouragement, publicity, and respect for indigenous NGOs that have tapped their own resources and become tools to build more vibrant and democratic civil societies out of the ruins of communism.The ninth article: “Civil Society in Serbia after Milošević: Between Authoritarianism and Wishful Thinking” The author takes as the basic starting point Cohen and Arato's tripartite division of society in general into political, economic and civil societies. On this view, civil society is "a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of association (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. In political theory, the identification of a civil society is often constrained by severe preconditions posited as necessary and it very important. The concept of civil society has in the recent past been endowed with much political meaning, and used as an important weapon in political struggles, particularly in the process of dismantling real-existing socialism. For these reasons, as we will see next, the notion of civil society must be considered both in its descriptive guis and normative guis.For the beginning IvanSpasic told about the “Serbia's Belated Transition”Serbia passed the minimum threshold of democracy - the first electoral transfer of power from (former) communists to a non-communist government - only in 2000, more than a decade after the fall of the Wall. The overturn in the autumn of 2000 came by way of electoral defeat on 24 September of Slobodan Milosevic in federal4 presidential elections and of the coalition headed by him in federal parliamentary elections, followed by mass popular mobilization against the electoral fraud attempted by the defeated forces. The described process refers to the political society - the successful moves of the opposition parties, the weakness of the ruling party and its allies, the loosening of their hold over the forces of repression.This was necessary to mention the “Background: CivilSociety in Serbia before 2000”. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in some respects a member of the "family" of real-socialist countries: it had a one-party system in which the party-state, apart from controlling the economy, also penetrated all forms of societal organizing and monitored the channels of public communication. And it is very important for the quality of everyday life and for people's overall social experience, it diverged from the general patter. If we take the term "civil society" in its strong sense, in this period it did not exist, because the circumstances did not allow for its autonomous development. But in the other, broader sense, there were narrow, scattered, and mutually isolated spaces of free and autonomous societal organizing. But paradoxically, the "soft" nature of the Yugoslav system militated against the emergence of a genuine civil society. This in turn hindered the development of capabilities and skills for autonomous collective action and a timely recognition of opportunities for it. During the 1990s, civil society developed in a contradictory environment. On one hand, the formal political pluralization and the changed, post-1989 atmosphere facilitated the emergence of first genuine NGOs.If the 1990s are taken as a whole, the period 1997-2000 was in general most productive for the non-profit sector undergoing significant advance in terms of not just numerical growth but also improvement of infrastructure, increased professionalization, acquisition of management skills by the staff, and mutual cooperation and coordination.As for “The Role of Civil Society in the Change of 2000”, so the victory of the democratic forces in the autumn of 2000 was won not just by the political opposition, united in the DOS, but also, or perhaps more importantly, by the united civil society.While voter support for a united opposition remained strong, during the year 2000 the primacy was taken over by the idea of a united social opposition, i.e. a joining of all democratic forces in the society - NGOs, independent trade unions, civic initiatives, prominent individuals, universities, independent media, and democratically minded people at large - in the fight against the Milosevic regime. Financial input from the West to support the campaign was huge. Exact figures are unavailable, for rather understandable reasons, but estimates range in millions of dollars. To summarize, we have to notice, this instance of strategic unification of civil society with the (oppositional) political society points to the relativity of boundaries between the two, at least at turning points in a society's history.Then it’s necessary to discuss “Civil Society in SerbiaToday”. Interestingly, the NGO Directory run by the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector lists a much smaller number of organization. After 2000, civil society, along with all other social actors, has found itself in a new situation, facing a necessary reshaping of its identity and its relation to the state. Civil society has been influencing the shaping of state policies in many areas, through consultation, supply of relevant information, databases, contacts and know - how. The principal areas where the role of NGOs has been prominent is gender equality and gender/family related issues, the media, refugees and IDPs, the environment, legal protection of human rights, ethnic minority rights (especially in cases of minorities with incomplete political subjectivation, e.g. Roma and some smaller ethnic groups), and education. Then the author ought to discuss some factors internal to civil society that point to the discursive functions of the concept, or more precisely, the strong evaluative connotations it carries in general usage.The last part is “Theoretical Lessons”. The evidence of this ideological and political segmentationof current civil society in Serbia points to a theoretical problem. The normativity of the concept is partly due to the theoretical and political context of its contemporary revival, in which the "anti-politics" of East European dissidents and the leftist political theory of Western authors played prominent roles. As for civic groups, they mentioned above as belonging to the right are usually left out when "civil society" is discussed. What is more, this holds on both sides - in the perspective of the observers, and in the perspective of these actors themselves. The second theoretical point we are led to by examining the actual situation in Serbia is the relation of civil society to the state. The third theoretical point derivable from the Serbian material refers to the role of the international factor. Finely. as a conclusion we can see, that the described tendencies can bring lasting consequences, deepening the polarization into "pro-Westerners" and "pro-traditionalists" - a polarization which is most harmful for Serbia's future. Let me now openly take the personal perspective of a civil society insider: instead of engaging in wishful thinking - believing that commitment to and repeated utterance of certain magic words will make our wishes true - we have to translate the ideals of a liberal democratic polity internally, and peaceful and equal cooperation internationally, into a language fitting the real situation on the ground and close to the ears of ordinary citizens of Serbia, who are currently struggling with the difficult legacy of the Milosevic.The tenth article: “The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia”For the beginning we have to notice article discusses the reasons for the ten-year delay in the democratic transition in Serbia, focusing inparticular on opposition parties and civil society. It argues that the policy of opposition parties was partly responsible for the failure of an earlier fall of the Milosevic regime. While civil society has been similarly weak and divided, the article details how a number of NGOs proved to be crucial in the coordinated campaign which lead to the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in October 2000. The ten-year rule of Slobodan Milosevic's regime created a veritable wasteland in Serbia. First, the “HE OPPOSITION WITHIN THE SERBIAN PARTY SYSTEM”. Serbia during the Milosevic era was marked by multiparty elections that were neither free nor fair. In fact, the political system of the Milosevic period could be characterized as a hybrid regime, which, while maintaining a democratic faiade, was essentially authoritarian.In the party system, neither the conventional categorization into a left right ideological framework nor other aspects of established party systems seem to adequately grasp the party landscape of Serbia. Between 1997 and 2000, with the hardening of the regime's authoritarian tendencies, the relationship between opposition and the regime moved to the foreground.Next is “HE SERBIAN OPPOSITION IN THE EARLY 1990S”.nlike other transitional countries, which usually saw a broad anti-Communist coalition in the first free election, the opposition, with an extreme nationalist and a liberal wing, could not mount a unified challenge to Milosevic in the first elections, which confirmed the dominance of the Socialist Party and extended the fragmentation of the opposition. The opposition in the mid-1990s could be grouped into three different streams: the extreme-nationalist, democratic national, and reform oriented. rties in this grouping gave absolute priority to the "solution" of the national question, including the use of force, and placed less emphasis on the democratization of Serbia. After that we have to discuss “THE OPPOSITION FROM 1997 TO 2000”. Through the continuing fragmentation of the opposition over the course of the 1990s and the failure of the protests in the winter of 1996-97, a new structure of the opposition parties emerged. Still, in the absence of strong programmatic orientations, one cannot classify the parties along a traditional left-right scheme, despite their names. Instead, the parties can be best under stood in their relationship to the regime. Between 1997 and the elections in September 2000, one can identify the following groupings in the opposition. That we can read in this part. Next part is “THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN SERBIA” and “CIVIL SOCIETY?DRIVING FORCE OR MARGINAL FACTOR IN MILOSEVIC'S SERBIA?” Civil society in Serbia has been much praised after the successful change of regime in October 2000. It appeared that mass mobilization, based on the support of strong civil-society organizations was a driving force behind the collapse of the Milosevic regime. However, for muchof the 1990s, actors of civil society concern with democratization suffered from pronounced structural weaknesses. The past two decades saw the emergence of numerous organizations, primarily in Belgrade, that sought to act in support of broad societal issues, such as human rights, democratization, women's rights, and opposition to the wars. With the exception of some antiwar protests, most organizations of the "other Serbia" lacked the means to mobilize a number of citizens large enough to challenge the regime. In the end “THE ROLE OF NGOS IN THE CHANGE OF REGIME”. number of organizations emerged from the experience of the 1996 97 protests, which eventually helped bring about the change of regime in October 2000. Otporwas one of the movements, which were very much a product of the failed protests. Next to Otpor, the Center for Free Elections and Democracy came into being as a response to the election fraud and the subsequent protests. The center took upon itself the task of observing elections and monitoring election irregularities. Other nongovernmental organization resulting from the crucial 1996-97 period is G17, which brought together leading opposition economists in a think tank. As a conclusion, both the political opposition and some new actors of Serbian civil society managed to overcome some of the crucial hurdles in 2000 that had earlier effectively prevented the democratization of Serbia. As has been shown, this change was not a sudden development, but rather was the result of an often painful learning process; in particular, the experience of the civic protest in 1996-97 played a significant role in strengthening non-party opposition.
"Теневая экономика": причины, формы существования, пути сокращения, управление
тень, экономика управления
В экономической науке есть много непроанализированного. Не легко найти другой пример, когда масштабы экономического эффекта и уровня ее исследованности был бы настолько не соотносимы. Это проблема теневой экономики, которая содержит все сферы жизни человеческого общества.
Теневая экономика представляет собой часть неформальной экономики. Она характеризует комплекс экономических отношений, которые не отражаются в документах официальных.
Актуальность темы заключается в том, что теневой сектор экономики присутствует во всех странах, он является элементом любой экономической системы, но масштабы его могут сильно варьироваться.
Целью диссертационной работы является выявление основных причин роста теневой экономики и определение методов борьбы с ней. Для достижения цели необходимо решить следующие задачи:
1. Определить формы, виды, сущность теневой экономики;
2. Определить уровень развития теневого сектора в РФ;
3. Для того, чтобы обнаружить негативный эффект "теневой" деятельности на экономическую систему России;
4. Чтобы определить методы борьбы с теневой экономикой.
Объектом исследования являются всевозможные способы воздействия государства на теневой сектор экономики. Этот объект является самой теневой экономике.
1. Теоретические основы проблемы теневой экономики
1.1 Определение "теневой экономики"
В российской научной литературе существует три основных подхода к пониманию "теневая экономика": учетно-статистический подход, формально-правовой и оптимизационно-позитивный подход.
Учетно-статистический подход. Этот подход применяется тогда, когда речь идет о степени распространения теневых экономических отношений. С точки зрения этого подхода, теневая экономика "представляет собой совокупность скрываемых от органов государственного управления и контроля экономических отношений между хозяйствующими субъектами в процессе производства, распределения, обмена и потребления экономических благ и предпринимательских возможностей". [1, c. 751]
В этом определении есть существенные недостатки. Во-первых, она включает в себя "твердых" установка на необходимость полного "управления и контроля": в этой интерпретации можно заметить, что, в частности, для того, чтобы скрыть какой-либо экономической деятельности от государственного контроля и управления - незаконно. В реальной экономической практике, многие процессы рыночного саморегулирования не имеют централизованного управления и контроля, в целом, положительно сказывающие на динамику экономического развития, и зачислять их в сферу негативных, теневых отношений было бы неправильно.