Русско-финская война

Thus, threat perception of the Finns was the result of certain historical processes, as constructivists claim. As states act according to their perception of the international system, and those perceptions are formed by the identities which consolidate practices and beliefs, creating norms, which in turn determine action.Thus, state behavior stems from certain interests and identities of the key actors.Finnish intransigence to the Soviet demands can be explained in a way by the Scandinavian concept of neutrality, which evolved from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. That approach focused on the futility of war as of a foreign policy mean and was to a certain point opportunistic.Finland’s Scandinavian outlook would not allow Helsinki breach its policy of neutrality. As a result, the Finnish government took a negative stand on Soviet proposals, which Prime Minister Cajander phrased as follows: “The proposal tends to violate Finland’s sovereignty and is in conflict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows in common with the nations of Scandinavia”.The Finnish refusal to concede which was taken by Stalin as a cause for war, also came from the dictate of the principle of sovereignty and the Constitutionalist heritage in Finland. Political elite of Finland saw the international law and bilateral treaty as a legitimate basis for no concessions position. Finnish historian LauriAadolfPuntilawrote: “The smallest concession would mean the abandonment of this principle and it would no longer be of any consequence how much territory was actually ceded”.The Soviet military command underestimated the Finnish popular reaction to the Soviet demands and to the war. Initially planned as a 12-days campaign, the war lasted 105 days. The Finns were extremely supportive of their government and had no intention of defecting to the Soviet Union.The Soviet Union, being a young state, did percept security threats gravely. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 did not diminish the worries of Stalin regarding Finland. He stated in October 1939: “We have good relations with Germany now, but in this world everything can change”. Months of futile negotiations made Stalin, who tended to take suspicious stand on all matters, fear that the time for diplomacy was slipping. Above that, he believed that Hitler was attempting to dismantle the West before turning eastward and quenching his initial thirst for lebensraum.According to constructivist assumptions, Soviet actions can be interpreted as an expression of the inner nature and security identity of the nation. ArenownedhistorianGordon F. Sander wrote in his book about the Winter War: “After Peter the Great and Alexander I it was turn of their communist descendants to once again change borders in the Baltic region to their own benefit”.He sees the conflict as an expression of the Russian imperial endeavor, disregarding geostrategic argumentin wartime. ConclusionThe chosen conceptual framework gives us an excellent opportunity for complex analysisof the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. On the one hand,neorealist theory explains the rising tensions between the Soviet Union and Finland, Finland’s importance for long-term Soviet strategy, and the gradual escalation towards a military conflict. A neorealist interpretation of the Soviet position explains the need of Moscow to preserve its influence and security in the international system. Given the international situation, Stalin responded to the rising German militarism by securing any vulnerability along Russia’s borders. Finland’s strategic position made it exceedingly important in this regard. Finland posed a threat to Russia, because its territory provided clear access to the Soviet northwestern border.On the other hand, constructivism contributes by providing plausible explanation of why the Soviet leadership considered war the only expedient optionleading to the actual outbreak of hostilities. Soviets’ perception of threats and Finnish intransigence made Stalin go for war, and constructivism explains the origins of such intransigent behavior. The Finns stood up for the ideas of Constitutionalism and neutrality deeply entrenched into their identity. The neorealist approach gives us a clear picture of the external security environment which put enormous pressures on all actors. The international system forced the military option. The constructivist approach explains why that option was made based on the internal characteristics. 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